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NOTES
THE COLORADO DEAD MAN STATUTE
A LTHOUGH the dead man statute in Colorado is older than
1  the state itself and has been an issue in scores of decisions by
the supreme court, neither its long existence nor its frequent ap-
pearance in the courtroom has contributed significantly to making it
a commonly understood doctrine. The statute's underlying concept
of excluding the testimony of interested persons' and parties to the
action' existed at common law, and the rule was applied whether the
adversary was living or dead? It was reasoned that one who had an
interest in the outcome of the suit would have a strong motive to
distort the truth, and therefore should not be allowed to take the
stand to further his own purposes.
In England the disqualification for interest remained until the
middle of the nineteenth century when it was done away with in its
entiretI, but in this country the reform was less successful.' It was
argued here that allowing parties and interested persons to testify
would work harshly in controversies over transactions when one
party to the transaction had died and the other survived.' And so, as
the various states abolished the common law incompetency based on
interest, they enacted statutes, commonly called "dead man statutes,"
retaining the former rule when one of the parties was deceased at
the time of the trial.' It is not surprising, then, that the dead man
statute has been called a vestigial remainder of the common law
rule that a pecuniary interest renders the testimony of a witness in-
competentJ
The common law rule came to an end in Colorado in 1870,
when a witness's interest in the outcome of the case was removed by
1 Combs v. Howard, 131 S.W.2d 206, 212 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
22 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 577, at 693 (3d ed. 1940).
3 97 C.J.S. Witnesses § 121, at 546 (1957).
4 2 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 695 (rule against interested persons abolished
in 1843; disqualification of parties eliminated in 1851).
5 McCoRmicK, EVIDENCE § 65, at 142 (1954).
6Rich v. Hunter, 135 Fla. 309, 185 So. 141, 145 (1938):
The purpose of [the dead man statute] . .. was to remove the common-
law disability arising from interest, except where one of the parties to the
transaction or communication was, at the time of the hearing, dead, insane,
or a lunatic. In those cases the disabilities arising from interest, imposed by
the common-law are retained by the statute; but the statute disqualifies those
only who were disqualified by the common-law.
7 Kamp v. Hargis Bldg. Co., 238 S.W.2d 277, 282 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
8 Territorial Laws of Colorado 1870, p. 63.
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legislation as a bar to his testifying,' except in cases within the scope
of the dead man statute. Since 1881 this exception for the dead man
statute has been the springboard for much litigation," and the dis-
pute continues today." The dead man statute itself is currently found
in Colorado Revised Statutes, section 154-1-2 (1963), where the
pertinent portion provides:
No party to any civil action, suit or proceeding, or person directly
interested in the event thereof, shall be allowed to testify therein, of
his own motion, or in his own behalf . .. when any adverse party
sues or defends as ... the executor or administrator, heir, legatee or
devisee of any deceased person, or as guardian or trustee of any
such heir, legatee or devisee; unless when called as a witness by such
adverse party so suing or defending, and except in the following
cases; [Here follows a list of seven exceptions which will be dealt
with in Part IV, infra.] (Emphasis added.)
Since the statute was adopted nearly verbatim from an Illinois stat-
ute, 2 it is often helpful to refer to Illinois decisions when attempting
to construe the statute or predict the course which the Colorado court
may take in the future.is
I. PURPOSE OF THE STATUTE
In the middle of the nineteenth century when the various juris-
dictions were enacting their respective versions of the dead man
statute, the fundamental purpose of such statutes was said to be "to
prevent a person who was, or who might be assumed to be, a parti-
san witness from giving his version of a transaction with another
who was deceased and could not speak.'"" This idea of placing the
living and the dead upon terms of perfect equality still finds a good
deal of support today," and the Colorado court has said that the
dead man statute is "only a regulation to secure mutuality in the ac-
tion itself."' 6
This concern for mutuality is at times carried to such extremes
that one questions whether justice is, in fact, being served. The Colo-
rado court on one occasion rejected the only testimony tending to
establish a promissory note executed by a party who died prior to
9 The act has been codified and is presently found in COLO. REV. STAT. § 154-1-1
(1963): "All persons, without exception, other than those specified in sections 154-
1-2 to 154-1-8 may be witnesses. Neither parties nor other persons who have an
interest in the event of an action or proceeding shall be excluded ..
'( Palmer v. Hanna, 6 Colo. 55 (1881).
11 Sussman v. Barach, 401 P.2d 608 (Colo. 1965).
12 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 51, § 2 (Bar ed. 1963).
13 In re Shapter's Estate, 35 Colo. 578, 585, 85 Pac. 688, 691 (1906): "The rule is
well settled that in adopting the statute of another state we adopt the construction
given it by the courts of that state."
14Abbott v. Doughan, 204 N.Y. 223, 97 N.E. 599, 600 (1912).
15 In re Repush's Will, 257 Wis. 528, 44 N.W.2d 240 (1950).
1' Fadam v. Midcap, 112 Colo. 573, 578-79, 152 P.2d 682, 684 (1944).
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trial, since the sole witness had a pecuniary interest, even though the
court recognized that it was quite possibly preventing the establish-
ment of an honest defense. 7 A doctrine which leads to such results
is not defensible, even when the avowed purpose is to protect "estates,
widows and minor heirs, who without some rule of evidence of this
kind, would find themselves at the mercy of any unprincipled
debtor."18
It would seem then, that the purpose of the dead man statute
could be categorically stated as follows: (1) to prevent unjust claims
against decedents' estates; (2) to place the living and the dead on
equal terms; and (3) to protect widows and children. While such
attempts at justifying the statute have been vigorously attacked,"9
the fact remains that the statute exists, and practicing attorneys must
be aware of its requirements and scope.
II. THE STATUTE INVOKED -THE REQUIREMENT
OF THREE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS
In order to invoke the statute to exclude the testimony of a
witness, there are three necessary elements, all of which must be
present: (A) The witness must be a member of a class which is
rendered incompetent by the statute; (B) The party against whom
the testimony is offered must belong to a class protected by the
statute; and (C) The testimony itself must be of a nature forbidden
by the statute.
20
A. Classes of Persons Excluded From Testifying
1. Interested Persons
There are actually two classes of persons which are rendered
incompetent by the Colorado statute: (1) parties to a civil action
where the adverse party represents a decedent; and (2) persons di-
rectly interested in the result of that action. The exclusion of testi-
mony of "interested" witnesses has no doubt been the foundation of
more litigation than any other single aspect of the dead man statute.
It has been said, in general, that the true test of the interest which
will disqualify a witness is whether he will "by the direct legal op-
eration and effect of the judgment, gain or lose, pecuniarily, or
[whether] the record will be legal evidence for or against him in
some other action, as an establishment . . . of the matters about
which he is offered to testify."'" It is not surprising that this re-
17Williams v. Carr, 4 Colo. App. 363, 367, 36 Pac. 644, 645 (1894).
18 Ibid.
19 See discussion pp. 363-65 infra.
2097 C.J.S. Witnesses § 132, at 557 (1957).
21 Id. § 170, at 609.
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quirement of "direct pecuniary gain or loss" has been often men-
tioned in the Colorado courts.22
The directness requirement is of particular importance. The
distinction between direct and indirect interest was carefully pointed
out in the case of Eder v. Methodist Episcopal Church Ass'n,2 where
the representatives of several churches sought the admission to pro-
bate of a will allegedly executed by one Martin Eder, deceased, nam-
ing the several churches as beneficiaries of his estate. The court al-
lowed the attorney for the proponents of the alleged will to testify
relative thereto since his fee was not contingent on the outcome of
the case; it allowed the members of the several churches to testify
since "the privilege of attending public worship does not . . . dis-
qualify a witness,"2 but it excluded the testimony of the other named
beneficiaries under the will since they would gain directly if the will
were established. 5
It will be noted that the attorney and the members of the church
would not have gone home from the trial one penny richer or poorer
regardless of the outcome of the case, i.e., there was no direct pecuni-
ary interest. It is true that establishment of the will would have
caused the church members to gain indirectly, and it might be con-
tended that they had sufficient motive to distort the truth and should
have been disqualified as witnesses. However, to disqualify a wit-
ness on these grounds would be to confuse incompetency with lack
of credibility. The fact that a witness may be biased or prejudiced is
not enough in itself to make him incompetent under the dead man
statute if he is not, in fact, in a position to gain or lose directly." It
must also be noted that whereas neither the attorney nor the church
members could have filled their own pockets by establishing the will,
that is precisely what the named beneficiaries would have been able
to do, and it was this direct interest which resulted in the exclusion
of their testimony.2'
22 E.g., Eder v. Methodist Episcopal Church Ass'n, 94 Colo. 173, 29 P.2d 631 (1934);
Love v. Cotten, 65 Colo. 593, 179 Pac. 806 (1919) ; Allen v. Shires, 47 Colo. 433,
107 Pac. 1070 (1910); Smith v. Smith, 22 Colo. 480, 46 Pac. 128 (1896); Salkregg
v. Thomas, 27 Colo. App. 259, 149 Pac. 273 (1915).
23 94 Colo. 173, 29 P.2d 631 (1934).
24 Id. at 180, 29 P.2d at 634.
25Ibid.
26 Paschall v. Reed, 320 Ill. App. 390, 51 N.E.2d 342, 344 (1943):
[T]he interest which will disqualify a witness to testify in a suit involving an
administrator must be legal, certain and immediate interest, and such interest
must be direct, certain and vested. Otherwise it does not disqualify him, and
the interest in such event goes only to the credibility of the witness and not to
the competency of such witness.
21 In Lee v. Leibold, 102 Colo. 408, 79 P.2d 1049 (1938), the court pointed out the
distinction between straight fees and contingent fees as bearing on "directness" of
the interest. The former do not make the attorney a party in interest within the terms




Another type of "interest" problem has been presented by a
series of cases involving witnesses who have a relationship to a busi-
ness which is a party to the litigation. Stockholders of a national
bank have been held incompetent to give testimony on behalf of the
bank to establish a claim against the estate of a decedent,28 and
stockholders of a corporation were excluded as witnesses in a similar
case.' In both cases the court reasoned that since the stockholders
are the legal owners of the corporation, a direct gain of the corpora-
tion is a direct gain of the owners. Obviously, mere employees of
the corporation would have no such direct interest in the outcome
of the litigation."
Not unlike the problem of persons who have a business relation-
ship to a business which is a litigating party, is the question which
arises where the witness is a relative of one of the parties to the ac-
tion. In Colorado, a relative of a party has been held not to be di-
rectly interested and has been treated as any other witness. The wife
of a legatee has been held competent as a witness to support the
will,3 ' and a wife has been declared a competent witness in her hus-
band's behalf to establish his claim against a decedent's estate. 2 Cer-
tainly, if a spouse is competent, a more distant relative should not be
barred by the statute, and the supreme court has so held.3
Just as the courts are concerned with whether or not the wit-
ness's interest is so direct that the judgment will actually put money
in his pocket or take it therefrom, so also, a great deal of emphasis
is placed upon the degree of certainty with which it can be deter-
mined that the gain or loss will, in fact, result. Thus, those who
might be beneficiaries under a subsequent will if a prior will is dis-
proved do not have a sufficiently certain interest to preclude their
testimony at the will contest.34
While a pecuniary interest in the outcome of the action is always
sufficient to render a witness incompetent, mere interest in the sub-
ject matter of the litigation is not, by itself, sufficient. 5 Thus, where
the plaintiff attempted to establish a contract made with a person
2
8 Brown v. First Nat'l Bank, 49 Colo. 393, 113 Pac. 483 (1911).
2 Gilmour v. Hawley Merchandise Co., 21 Colo. App. 307, 121 Pac. 765 (1912).
30 Ainsworth v. Ainsworth, 102 Colo. 392, 79 P.2d 1045 (1938).
31 In re Hatfield's Will, 21 Colo. App. 443, 122 Pac. 63 '(1912); accord, White v.
Bower, 56 Colo. 575, 136 Pac. 1053 (1913).
32 White v. Christopherson, 46 Colo. 46, 102 Pac. 747 (1909).
33 Burnham v. Grant, 24 Colo. App. 131, 134 Pac. 254 (1913).
3 4 Hughes v. Williams, 300 111. App. 108, 20 N.E.2d 860 (1939). But see Brantner v.
Papish, 109 Colo. 437, 126 P.2d 1032 (1942), where the court believed it evident
that the children of the deceased would inherit her estate if the will were disproved,
and consequently excluded their testimony.
35 Popejoy v. Bahr, 67 Colo. 385, 176 Pac. 947 (1919).
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since deceased,36 the supreme court held that it was error to exclude
the testimony of a witness who had a case pending which involved
the same contract. The court pointed out that the witness would be
interested only in the validity of the contract, not in the outcome
of the particular suit. "In order to disqualify a witness, his interest
...must be in the event of the particular case, and not merely in
the question to be decided therein.""
It has been seen that the interest must be both direct and certain
if the testimony of the witness is to be rejected. Apparently, a third
requirement, which has received little attention, is that the interest
cannot be nominal. Only one Colorado case has dealt with this re-
quirement. 8 Where a testator's nephew had been "cut off" with a
legacy of one dollar, he was allowed to testify as to the validity of
the will since "[the] dollar bequest could not reasonably be con-
sidered as conferring a material interest upon [the nephew] .... 39
It would seem that this case poses a somewhat provocative precedent
since the court has left itself open to future determination of the
monetary value which is necessary before interest exists. Is it an ab-
solute value or a value relative to the entire estate? Should it mat-
ter whether the legatee is wealthy or poor? The line must be drawn
somewhere, but there has, as yet, been no indication of what will be
done.
In all of the cases discussed thus far, the interested witness has
always been excluded when offered to testify in an action where his
testimony would directly benefit him. It should be noted here that
the dead man statute itself provides that the witness shall be barred
only when he testifies "of his own motion, or in his own behalf.''40
Thus, where the witness testifies against his own interest, the statute
is not a bar.4 The logic employed here is no doubt similar to that
which created the exception to the hearsay rule when the out-of-court
declarant makes statements against his own interest.' If the witness
is willing to testify under oath to facts adverse to him financially, he
is presumed to be telling the truth.
2. Parties
Interested witnesses are not the only persons disqualified by the
dead man statute; parties to the action are also excluded. The Colo-
38 Love v. Cotten, 65 Colo. 593, 179 Pac. 806 (1919).
37 Id. at 596, 179 Pac. at 807.
3
8 Lamborn v. Kirkpatrick, 97 Colo. 421, 50 P.2d 542 (1935).
3 Id. at 424, 50 P.2d at 544-
4 0
CoLo. REV. STAT. § 154-1-2 (1963).
41 Sussman v. Barash, 401 P.2d 608 (Colo. 1965) ; In re Thomas' Estate, 144 Colo. 358,
356 P.2d 963 (1960).
42 See generally MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE §§ 253-56 (1954).
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rado court first invoked the statute in 1894,' saying: "[N]o party is
allowed to testify of his own motion where the adverse party defends
as an heir, etc., of a decedent .... ." The statute has since been re-
ferred to on numerous occasions." Although most of the matters
litigated involve claims against a decedent's estate, the statute is
equally applicable where it is the estate that makes the claim. 5 It
would appear, then, that any party to an action is automatically in-
competent where the adverse party represents a decedent's estate.
But what of situations where the individual is named as a party
but is neither a necessary party to the action nor a real party in inter-
est? He is technically a party to the action, but he has no direct and
certain interest in the outcome thereof. The Colorado court addressed
this problem in Klein v. Munz," where it was said:
[T]his statute was not intended to, and does not, permit an execu-
tor to join an uninterested person as a party defendant and thereby
deny him the right to testify. Certainly the interest of such de-
fendant must be shown before the bar of the statute may be in-
voked.4"
The court has taken a similar stand where the person whose testi-
mony was excluded was a necessary party but not a real party in
interest: 48
There is a vast difference between those who are required to be
made formal parties, or those who have no personal interest in the
result of the controversy, and those who are required to be made
parties because of the respective personal and property interests
involved in the issue to be determined .... 4
It becomes obvious from this discussion that the disqualification of
parties is really a result of their being "interested" persons.
Although the Colorado court has not dealt squarely with the
problem, it would appear that if a person is, in fact, a proper party
to the action, the accompanying fact that the plaintiff's motive in
making him a party was merely to prevent him from testifying for
his co-defendant will not prevent the application of the disqualifying
statute." However, the mere naming of a person as a party could
never be enough to invoke the statute against him if he is never
served with process and therefore does not appear as a party. The
43 Carpenter v. Ware, 4 Colo. App. 458, 461, 36 Pac. 298, 299 (1894). The statute
referred to is the predecessor of CoLo. REV. STAT. § 154-1-2 (1963).
44Reiter v. Pollard, 75 Colo. 203, 225 Pac. 222 (1924); Temple v. Magruder, 36 Colo.
390, 85 Pac. 832 (1906); accord, Young v. Burke, 139 Colo. 305, 338 P.2d 284
(1959); In re Eder's Estate, 94 Colo. 173, 29 P.2d 631 (1934) ; Stratton v. Rice,
66 Colo. 407, 181 Pac. 529 (1919).
5Keeler v. Hoyt, 57 Colo. 120, 140 Pac. 191 (1914).
4687 Colo. 223, 286 Pac. 112 (1930).
471d. at 225, 286 Pac. at 113.
4 BRisbry v. Swan, 124 Colo. 567, 239 P.2d 600 (1951).
49 1d. at 577, 239 P.2d at 606.
5 0 Sullivan v. Corn Products Ref. Co., 245 111. 9, 91 N.E. 643 (1910).
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Illinois court has so held. 1 Similarly, it has been established in Colo-
rado that where an action has been commenced and one party sub-
sequently dies, the executors of his estate have the right to be sub-
stituted as parties notwithstanding the consequent effect of the ex-
clusion of witnesses under the statute.52
A misunderstanding of the statute has resulted in some confu-
sion as to whether or not the administrators, executors, heirs, etc., are
themselves competent to testify. The wording of the statute is rela-
tively clear in this regard. It provides specifically that no party or
interested person shall testify where "any adverse party" represents
a deceased person. It follows from this language that neither the
administrator nor executor is to be barred from testifying, but
that only those persons and parties "adverse" to the administrator
or executor shall be disqualified from testifying. In general, "an
executor or administrator is usually a competent witness where he is
a party in his representative capacity, at least where he is a witness
on behalf of the estate he represents.""3 The Illinois court has so
held with respect to both administrators 4 and heirs. 5 This is not to
say however, that one who represents a deceased person is never
rendered incompetent by the dead man statute. Fact situations pre-
sent themselves where the party adverse to the administrator or heir
also represents a decedent, and in such a case the statute would dis-
qualify both parties.
B. Classes of Persons Protected
The dead man statute provides that the following persons shall
receive its protection: "the executor or administrator, heir, legatee
or devisee of any deceased person, or ... guardian or trustee of any
such heir, legatee or devisee.'"'" This list is neither long nor com-
plex, and it leaves little room for doubt or argument. Any person
who sues or defends in one of these capacities is within the scope of
the statute, and all others are outside of its protection. Where a
party is within a protected class and his co-party is not, the latter may
not invoke the statute. 8 Thus, the statute does not actually make the
51 Sankey v. Interstate Dispatch, Inc., 339 11. App. 420, 90 N.E.2d 265 (1950).
52 Butler v. Rockwell, 14 Colo. 125, 23 Pac. 462 (1889).
53 97 C.J.S. Witnesses § 155, at 596 (1957).
54 Bailey v. Robison, 244 Ill. 16, 91 N.E. 98, 100 (1910): "The disqualification under
the statute is not against the party suing or defending as administrator, but against
the party suing or defending adversely to the administrator."
55 Weiss v. Beck, 1 Ill. 2d 420, 115 N.E.2d 768, 774 (1953): "It is not the heir who
is disqualified from testifying under the Evidence Act, but it is the party adverse to
the one suing or defending as an heir that is disqualified."
5 in re Shapter's Estate, 35 Colo. 578, 85 Pac. 688 (1906).
57 
COLo. REV. STAT. § 154-1-2(1) (1963).
58 Haffner v. Van Blarcom, 84 Colo. 565, 569, 272 Pac. 621, 622 (1928): "[T]he
protection of the statute extends only to adverse parties within the designated class
and not to their co-parties not within such class."
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witness incompetent for all purposes, and where there are multiple
defendants, only some of whom represent decedents, the witness's
testimony will be admitted as against those defendants who are not
legal representatives or heirs of a decedent. 9 However, the mere
fact that such a person could be joined as a party defendant will not
remove the disqualifying effect of the dead man statute where the
only adverse party actually named in the suit represents a decedent's
estate."0
Not only is the protection of the dead man statute limited to
the legal representatives of deceased persons, but that representative
capacity must be alleged and proved before the protection of the
statute may be invoked. This rule was established in the leading
case of Prewitt v. Lambert,6 where the court stated that when a per-
son sued individually undertakes to defend as an administrator, he
must establish by positive averment and proof at a preliminary pro-
ceeding that he is the administrator and thereby is entitled to the
protection of the statute.
There has been some question raised concerning the availability
of the protection of the dead man statute to partnerships and cor-
porations following the death of a partner or corporate officer. In
the case of a corporation, the statute apparently does not bar the ad-
mission of statements made by a corporate officer which are binding
on the corporation even though the officer dies prior to trial."2 This
conclusion is perhaps best explained by the fact that the officer is
not a real party in interest, and, therefore, any protection to which
his administrator would be entitled if sued alone should not extend
to the corporation." Where partnerships are concerned, the pro-
tection available is specifically controlled by statute,64 and the
distinguishing factor determining admissibility is whether one or
more of the surviving partners were present at the time of the
59 Watson v. Woodley, 71 Colo. 391, 207 Pac. 335 (1922); accord, Sauer v. First
Nat'l Bank, 75 Colo. 119, 224 Pac. 227 (1924) (defendant defended in her indi-
vidual as well as representative capacity) ; Gabrin v. Brister, 65 Colo. 407, 177 Pac.
134 (1918) (defendant was sued as executrix and in individual capacity); Nesbitt
v. Swallow, 63 Colo. 194, 164 Pac. 1163 (1917).
60 Creev. Becker, 49 Colo. 268, 112 Pac. 783 (1911).
61 19 Colo. 7, 34 Pac. 684 (1893).
62 Garden of Gods Village v. Hellman, 133 Colo. 286, 294 P.2d 597 (1956).
63 It would appear that Colorado is definitely in the minority in its holding that a corpora-
tion is not within the class of protected persons. 97 C.J.S. Witnesses § 212, at 654
(1957).
6 COLO. REv. STAT. § 154-1-4 (1963):
Conversation of deceased partner. - In any action, suit or proceeding, by
or against any surviving partner or joint contractor, no adverse party or per-
son adversely interested in the event thereof, shall be rendered a competent
witness to testify by virtue of section 154-1-1, to any admission or conversa-
tion by any deceased partner or joint contractor, unless some one or more of
the surviving partners or joint contractors were also present at the time of
such admission or conversation.
1966
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original conversation or transaction. The Colorado court has held
that where the surviving partner who was so present is also de-
fending as the legal representative of the deceased partner's estate,
the decedent's admission or conversation is admissible against the
defendant in his capacity as surviving partner and inadmissible
against him in his representative capacity." The only limitation im-
posed is a proper jury instruction relating to the purposes for which
the testimony is being admitted. It is obvious that this interpretation
has diluted the effect of the dead man statute in those fact situations
where a surviving partner is also the representative of his deceased
associate since it allows the jury to hear the evidence regardless of
the fact that the adverse party represents a decedent. A similar prob-
lem results where the court admits the testimony in cases where the
decedent's representative has a co-party who is not protected by the
dead man statute.
C. Testimony Excluded
It should be noted at the outset, when addressing the problem
of the testimony excluded by the dead man statute, that it is really
the witness who is excluded, not his testimony. The statute does not
render any evidence, as such, incompetent. It simply bars proof of
certain matters by particular witnesses: "[T~he reason for rejection
of the testimony necessarily is the incompetency of the person, not
the testimony.''6" In any given action, there may be nothing objection-
able about any particular evidence coming in, provided it is given
by a competent witness.
Furthermore, the disqualification extends only to testimony re-
lating to facts occurring before the death of the decedent.67 If the
witness is, in fact, an interested person or a party to the suit, and if
the testimony he desires to give on his own behalf is related to facts
which occurred prior to the decedent's death, "the character of his
his testimony and the subject matter about which he testifies are to-
tally unimportant.''8
There has been some question as to the effect of a writing in-
troduced on behalf of a witness otherwise rendered incompetent by
the statute. The court has distinguished between two types of writ-
ings: (1) self-serving statements written by the witness himself; and
(2) statements written by persons other than the witness. The for-
mer are incompetent and are therefore not admitted, particularly
65Savard v. Hcrbe.. I Colo. App. 445, 29 Pac. 461 (1892)
66 Balla v. Sladek, 381 Pa. 85, 112 A.2d 156, 160 (1955).
6 7 Keeler v. Hoyt, 57 Colo. 120, 140 Pac. 191 (1914).
68 Jones v. Henshall, 3 Colo. App. 448, 451, 34 Pac. 254, 255 (1893).
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where they were written after the death of the decedent. 9 The latter
are admissible, provided they are properly authenticated, but the in-
competent witness cannot himself verify them.7" This is a perfect ex-
ample of the rule that while the evidence itself may not be incom-
petent, the witness may be.
A somewhat different problem is presented where the offered
writing is a book account. Colorado Revised Statutes, section 154-
1-3 (1963) provides that any party or interested person is allowed to
testify as to his book accounts and entries therein, but it has been
held that this enabling statute is neither an amendment of, nor an ex-
ception to, the dead man statute.7' The result is that while the ac-
count books themselves are admissible if the proper preliminary
proof is given, the witness who is rendered incompetent by the dead
man statute cannot give that preliminary proof.72
III. NATURE OF THE ACTION
Just as the statute makes no distinction regarding the type of
testimony which it will exclude, neither does the nature of the ac-
tion affect the working of the statute. The prohibition is the same
in equity as in law,73 although it has no application in criminal cases
since the wording of the statute specifically limits it to "civil actions."
There is no reason to believe that the Colorado court would disagree
with the general rule that the dead man statute covers the compe-
tency of witnesses in any civil proceeding, regardless of form or
class, before any tribunal, whether the action be legal or equitable.74
IV. OBJECTIONS AND CROSS-EXAMINATION
In order to avail himself of the protection of the dead man
statute, a party must make a timely objection on the grounds of in-
competency,75 and failure to make such an objection waives it. Where
69 Butler v. Phillips, 38 Colo. 378, 392, 88 Pac. 480, 484 (1906): "The claimant being
disqualified as a witness by virtue of [the dead man statute] . . . , no self-serving
statement made by him in the form of a letter could be competent evidence."
7OCarpenter v. Ware, 4 Colo. App. 458, 36 Pac. 298 (1894) (letters written to his
children by one since deceased; held, widow not competent to verify said letters).
71 Wilson v. Warner, 83 Colo. 280, 282, 264 Pac. 657, 658 (1928): "Had it been the
intention of the Legislature to make book accounts also an exception, it would have
included them among the others." Accord, Oswald v. Dawn, 143 Colo. 487, 354 P.2d
505 (1960).
72 Haines v. Christie, 28 Colo. 502, 66 Pac. 883 (1901).
73 Williams v. Carr, 4 Colo. App. 368, 36 Pac. 646 (1894); Whitsett v. Kershow, 4
Colo. 419 (1878).
7497 C.J.S. Witnesses § 133, at 564 (1957).
75 Faden v. Midcap, 112 Colo. 573, 577, 152 P.2d 682, 684 (1944): "It is incumbent
upon the party seeking to take advantage of the incompetency of a witness to inter-
pose an objection on that ground, in the absence of which the objection is deemed
waived and the witness is properly allowed to testify." Accord, Rigsbry v. Swan, 124
Colo. 567, 239 P.2d 600 (1951) ; Fister v. Fister, 122 Colo. 432, 222 P.2d 620
(1950); Brown v. First Nat'l Bank, 49 Colo. 393, 113 Pac. 483 (1911); Cree v.
Becker, 49 Colo. 268, 112 Pac. 783 (1911) ; Temple v. Magruder, 36 Colo. 390, 85
Pac. 832 (1906) ; Jones v. Henshall, 3 Colo. App. 448, 34 Pac. 254 (1893).
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situations arise in which a person is competent to testify to some
matters and incompetent as to others, the objection should not be
made until he is asked to testify to the matters as to which he is in-
competent. 8 However, if the objection is made when the witness
takes the stand, "the party tendering him should state what he pro-
poses to prove by him, so that the court may know that it is proper."77
So that his objections may be timely, counsel must know at what
point in time the witness becomes incompetent. In the case of an
"interested" witness, from what point in time must the interest have
existed? Apparently, interest in the event of the suit must be deter-
mined as of the time the testimony is offered rather than at the time
the action was filed. 8 If the witness has a disqualifying interest at
the time he is questioned in the courtroom, an objection is timely and
proper. Similarly, when a party to an action dies during its progress
prior to the introduction of the testimony objected to as incompetent,
the objection is proper since "incompetency at the time the witness
is sworn is the test.
79
The party entitled to the protection of the dead man statute can
waive it not only by failing to make timely objection, but also by
himself calling the otherwise incompetent witness to testify." Fur-
thermore, once the witness becomes competent in this manner, the
competency extends to any and all testimony pertinent to the issues
of the case," and he is not limited to the specific topics about which
his adversary questioned him. And if the witness is rendered com-
petent to testify at one trial, the competency obtains at subsequent
trials of the same cause."
Cross-examination of a witness incompetent under the dead
man statute can have the same effect as calling that witness to testi-
fy." However, cross-examination must bring out facts to which the
witness would otherwise have been incompetent to testify before it
7s Parker v. Hilliard, 106 Colo. 187, 193, 102 P.2d 734, 736 (1940).
77 Ibid.
78 Miller v. Hepner, 136 Colo. 48, 314 P.2d 604 (1957).
79 97 C.J.S. Witnesses § 138, at 577 (1957).
80 COLO. REv. STAT. § 154-1-2 (1) (1963) provides that a witness who would other-
wise be incompetent under the dead man statute is free to testify "when called as a
witness by such party suing or defending."
81 Allen v. Shires, 47 Colo. 433, 436, 107 Pac. 1070, 1071 (1910): "[W]hen . . .a
disqualified witness is called by the adverse party and examined by him as a witness
upon certain matters pertinent to some of the issues in the case, such witness is
thereby rendered competent for all purposes." Accord, Jerome v. Bohm, 21 Colo.
322, 40 Pac. 570 (1895) ; Warren v. Adams, 19 Colo. 515, 36 Pac. 604 (1894).
82 Finch v. McCrimmon, 100 Colo. 315, 67 P.2d 623 (1937).
83 Stender v. Cunningham, 123 Colo. 5, 10, 225 P.2d 52, 54 (i950):
We are unable to escape the conclusion that by cross-examination of [the]
proponent concerning conversations and transactions occurring prior to the
death of the decedent, the proponent was thereby rendered competent to testify
for all purposes and that the inhibitions of the statute do not apply.
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will have the effect of lifting the bar of the statute. Merely cross-
examining a witness to such an extent as to disclose his interest and
consequent incompetency is not a waiver of the right to object to the
witness's competency. 4
V. STATUTORY EXCEPTIONS
The dead man statute in Colorado is subject to seven exceptions
which are found in Colorado Revised Statutes, section 154-1-2
(1963), subsections (1)-(7). The first of these provides quite
simply that parties and interested persons shall not be barred from
testifying to any fact which occurred subsequent to the death of the
deceased person." The clarity of this exception allows it to speak
for itself, and it has been upheld in several decisions.86
The second exception relates to situations where an agent of the
deceased testifies for the administrator (or executor, heir, etc.) re-
garding a conversation or transaction between that agent and an op-
posing party. It is provided that such testimony by the agent makes
the adverse party competent to testify to that same conversation or
transaction. 7 Obviously, since the deceased's lips are no longer
sealed, due to his agent's appearance to speak for him, the need for
equality between the living and dead no longer requires that the ad-
verse party remain silent. However, the adverse party's testimony
must be confined to facts concerning the same transaction or con-
versation to which the agent has testified. If it can be shown that
the agent's testimony relates to something other than a specific
transaction or conversation, the exception does not apply.8 Although
no cases can be found on point, it would seem logical that this latter
statement is applicable to all statutory exceptions dealing specifically
with "transactions" or "conversations."
The third exception allows the adverse party to testify where
the administrator himself takes the stand, or an interested person
does so in his behalf, and testifies to a conversation or transaction
84 Cordingly v. Kennedy, 239 Fed. 645 (8th Cir. 1917).
8 Coo. REV. STAT. § 154-1-2(2) (1963): "In any such action, suit or proceeding, a
party or interested person may testify to facts occurring after the death of such
deceased person."
86E.g., Eder v. Methodist Episcopal Church Ass'n, 94 Colo. 173, 29 P.2d 631 (1934);
Kitts v. Hill, 89 Colo. 186, 300 Pac. 610 (1931); Tourtellotte v. Brown, 18 Colo.
App. 355, 71 Pac. 638 (1903).
87 COO REv. STAT. § 154-1-2(3) (1963):
When . . . any agent of any deceased person, shall testify in behalf of
any person suing or being sued, in either of the capacities above named, to
any conversation or transaction between agent and the opposite party or parties
in interest, such party or parties in interest may testify concerning the same
conversation or transactions.
8Stratton v. Rice, 66 Colo. 407, 181 Pac. 529 (1919) (dated deposit slips and checks
in deceased's handwriting offered by administrator to show deceased's location at a
certain time did not constitute a "transaction" or a "conversation").
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between the deceased and the opposite party." Here again, the ad-
verse party's testimony must be limited to the specific transaction or
conversation about which the administrator or interested person
testified.
Under the fourth exception, the adverse party can testify when
a witness who is neither a party, an interested person, nor an agent
of the deceased, testifies to a conversation or admission by that ad-
verse party prior to the decedent's death, but not in the decedent's
presence." A simple example will help to clarify this exception.
Where an administrator brought an action for money owed by the
defendant to the deceased, the administrator introduced into evi-
dence a letter from the defendant to an heir-at-law written prior to
the death of the decedent. 1 The heir-at-law authenticated the letter.
Analyzing these facts in light of the requirements of the fourth ex-
ception, it can Ie seen that: (1) the witness was not a party, an in-
terested person, or an agent of the deceased; (2) the letter was writ-
ten and sent prior to the decedent's death; and (3) the letter was
not written or received in the decedent's presence. Having thus satis-
fied the requirements of the exception, it would not be error to allow
the defendant to testify in rebuttal. The court so held.
The fifth exception permits the adverse party to testify when
the deposition of the deceased has been introduced into evidence at
the trial, but the testimony is limited to matters contained in the
deposition. 2  The exception applies only where the deceased's legal
representative is the one who introduces the deposition. 3 Nor is it
enough that it merely be shown that the deceased's deposition was, in
fact, taken; it must actually be introduced at the trial.
8 9
CoLo. REV. STAT. § 154-1-2(4) (1963):
When . . . any such party suing or defending, or any person having a
direct interest in the event of such action, suit or proceeding, shall testify in
behalf of such party so suing or defending, to any conversation or transaction
with the opposite party or parties in interest, then such opposite party in inter-
est shall also be permitted to testify as to the same conversation or transaction.
9 0
COLO. REV. STAT. § 154-1-2(5) (1963):
When . . . any witness not a party to the record, or not a party in inter-
est, or not an agent of such deceased person, shall testify in behalf of any
party in such action, suit or proceeding, to any conversation or admission by
any adverse party or parties in interest, occurring before the death and in the
absence of such deceased person, such adverse party or parties in interest may
also testify to the same admission or conversation.
9 1 Denver Nat'l Bank v. McLagen, 133 Colo. 487, 298 P.2d 386 (1956).
92 COL REV. STAT. § 154-1-2(6) (1963):
When . . . the deposition of such deceased person shall be read in evi-
dence at the trial, any adverse party or parties in interest may testify as to all
matters and things testified to in such deposition by stuch deceased person,
and not excluded for irrelevancy or incompetency.
93 Levy v. Dwight, 12 Colo. 101, 107, 20 Pac. 12, 15 (1888): "IT]he introduction of
such testimony by the living party will not make such party a competent witness in
his own behalf."
94 1d. at 103, 20 Pac. at 14.
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The sixth exception provides that if the adverse party or in-
terested person made an admission to, or had a conversation with, or
knows of things connected with, the decedent, he can testify thereto
notwithstanding the fact that the conversation, admission, or other
fact occurred prior to the decedent's death, provided a member of
the decedent's family over sixteen years of age, or an heir, legatee
or devisee over sixteen years of age was present at the time and is
now present to testify, or can be procured for the purpose of giving
such testimony." The rationale here is that the relative, heir, legatee,
or devisee will adequately represent the interests of the estate to
avoid any danger of the adverse party's working a fraud. Thus, the
exception will usually be utilized by the court where it finds the wit-
ness to the transaction is representing the estate within the "spirit of
the statute.' '1
The seventh and final exception seems to have been seldom in-
voked in the Colorado courts. It merely provides that if a defendant
has ever been required to testify regarding his having concealed the
will or other property of the deceased, the written record of such
testimony is admissible on the defendant's behalf if it relates to the
estate of the decedent."? There has been no construction of this ex-
ception by the supreme court.
CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding its adoption by nearly all of the states, the
dead man statute has been the target of severe criticism since its in-
ception, and its attackers have insisted that it excludes far more valid
claims than false ones. It has been contended that the restriction
should be relaxed and that methods of investigating truth be substi-
9 5 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 154-1-2(7) (1963):
[A)ny adverse party or parties in interest may testify as to any conversation
or admission, or as to all matters and things connected with the subject matter
of said action, suit or proceeding, and which conversation and admission and
matters and things, occurred before the death and in the presence of such de-
ceased and also in the presence of any member of the family of such deceased
person over the age of sixteen years, or in the presence of any heir, legatee or
devisee of such deceased person over the age of sixteen years; provided, that
such member of the family, heir, legatee or devisee as the case may be, is
present at the hearing of said action, suit or proceeding, or whose testimony
is or may be procurable at such trial.
96 Walker v. Walker, 131 Colo. 328, 281 P.2d 1010 (1955); Koch v. Gamier, 110
Colo. 562, 136 P.2d 673 (1943) ; Brantner v. Papish, 109 Colo. 437, 126 P.2d 1032
(1942).
COLO. REv. STAT. § 154-1-2(8) (1963):
When the defendant in any such suit has previously been required to tes-
tify under the provisions of section 153-5-20 or section 153-10-42, the testi-
mony so given if reduced to writing, or the stenographic minutes thereof, so
far as the same relates to the estate concerning which or for the benefit of
which such suit is brought, and is relevant to the issue in such suit and com-




tuted. Thus, it has been suggested that cross-examination, the scru-
tiny of witnesses by the court and jury, and the power of circum-
stantial evidence to discredit the oral testimony of an interested wit-
ness are sufficient to uncover any fraudulent scheme which may be
afoot. 8
It may well be that Jeremy Bentham touched on what is the real
heart of the current arguments against the dead man statute when he
questioned the basic logic of any rule which excluded the testimony
of interested persons:
Does it follow, because there is a motive of some sort prompting
a man to lie, that for that reason he will lie? That there is danger
in such a case is not disputed; but does the danger approach to
certainty? This will not be contended. If it did, instead of shutting
the door against some witnesses, you ought not to open it to any.
An interest of a certain kind acts upon a man in a certain direction
opposite to the path of duty; but will he obey the impulse? That
will depend upon the forces tending to confine him to that path-
upon the prevalence of the one set of opposite forces or the other.
All bodies on or about the earth tend to the centre of the earth; yet
all bodies are not there. All mountains have a tendency to fall into
level with the plains; yet, notwithstanding, there are mountains. 99
The question, then, should be not whether a witness has an interest
in the outcome of the suit, but rather whether, under all the circum-
stances, it is likely that his interest will affect the competency of his
testimony and whether sufficient safeguards have been provided to
prevent this potential danger. To continue to uphold the dead man
statute as a necessary means of maintaining perfect equality between
the living and the dead is to confuse theory with practical effects.
As Professor Wigrnore has so ably pointed out, the theory of in-
competency based on interest is reducible in its essence to a syllogism,
both premises of which are quite obviously fallacious:1 first, when-
ever persons likely to give false testimony are offered as witnesses,
the only proper safeguard against a false decision is total exclusion
from the stand; second, persons having a pecuniary interest in the
outcome of a suit are likely to give false testimony; therefore, such
persons should be totally excluded. The first premise simply fails to
recognize the alternatives available and their proven effectiveness
(e.g., cross-examination, careful scrutiny of the witness by the court
and jury, and the effect of circumstantial evidence to discredit the
testimony of an interested witness), while the second premise over-
looks Bentham's appropriate acknowledgement of the fact that a
man's actions will be determined by the interaction of his impulse
to lie, with the forces which tend to counter-balance such an im-
9STaft, Comments On Will Contests In New York, 30 YALE L.J. 593, 605 (1921).
9 7 BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 393 (Bowring ed. 1827).
100 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 576, at 686 (3d ed. 1940).
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pulse, not the least of which is the moral influence of the oath, and
the feeling of futility in attempting to perpetrate a fraud in the face
of vigorous cross-examination by opposing counsel and careful scru-
tiny by the judge and jury.
A number of states have already recognized the basic illogic of
the dead man statute and have implemented alternative schemes for
dealing with cases involving transactions, one party to which had
died. In Oregon and New Mexico' no recovery is allowed if based
on the adverse party's sole testimony. There must be corroboration
of some sort. In Connecticut, Virginia, and Oregon, the adverse
party's testimony is admitted along with any writings or declarations
of the deceased party which relates to the same subject."° New
Hampshire and Arizona exclude the adverse party's testimony except
when the court feels that injustice will result from such exclusion. 3
The Connecticut statute, in particular, has won wide acclaim from
the practicing attorneys in that state, as well as approval from more
than 80o of the judges," 4 thereby indicating that experience has
shown it to be valuable.
It is submitted that the Colorado General Assembly would be
well-advised to re-evaluate the actual merits of retaining the dead
man statute in light of what would appear to be a discrepancy be-
tween the common law theory on which the statute is founded and
the practical realities of its operation.
Lowell J. Noteboom
101 Id. § 578, at 697.
1l2 Ibid.
103 Id. § 578, at 698.
1l4 Id. § 578(a), at 699.
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